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From Town Center to Shopping Center: 
The Reconfiguration of Community  Marketplaces in 
Postwar America 
LIZABETH COHEN 
WHEN  THE EDITORS OF TIME  MAGAZINE set out to tell readers in an early January 1965 
cover story why the American economy had flourished during the previous year, 
they explained it in terms that had become  the conventional wisdom of postwar 
America. The most prosperous twelve months ever, capping the country's fourth 
straight year of economic expansion, were attributable to the American consumer, 
"who continued  spending as if  there were  no  tomorrow." According to  Time's 
economics  lesson,  consumers, business,  and government "created a  nonvicious 
circle:  spending  created  more  production,  production  created  wealth,  wealth 
created more spending." In this simplified Keynesian model of economic growth, 
"the consumer is the key to our economy." As R. H. Macy's board chair Jack Straus 
explained to Time's readers, "When the country has a recession, it suffers not so 
much from problems of production as from problems of  consumption." And  in 
prosperous times like today, "Our economy keeps growing because our ability to 
consume  is  endless.  The  consumer goes  on  spending  regardless of  how  many 
possessions  he  has. The  luxuries of  today are the  necessities  of  tomorrow." A 
demand economy built on mass consumption had brought the United States out of 
the doldrums of the Great Depression and World War II, and its strength in the 
postwar period continued to impress those like retail magnate Straus whose own 
financial  future  depended  on  it.1 
Although Straus and his peers invested great energy and resources in developing 
new strategies for doing business in this mass-consumption economy, historians 
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1 "The Economy: The Great Shopping Spree," Time (January 8, 1965): 58-62  (and cover). 
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have paid far less attention to the restructuring  of American commercial life in the 
postwar period than to the transformation of residential experience. An impressive 
literature documents the way the expansion of a mass consumer society encouraged 
a larger and broader spectrum of Americans to move into suburban communities 
after the war.2  Between 1947 and 1953 alone, the suburban  population increased by 
43 percent, in contrast to a general population increase of only 11 percent.3 At an 
astonishing  pace,  the  futuristic  highways  and  mass-built,  appliance-equipped, 
single-family homes  that had been  previewed at the  New York World's Fair in 
1939-1940  seemed  to become  a reality. Thanks to  a shortage in urban housing, 
government subsidies in highway building and home construction or purchase, and 
pent-up consumer demand and savings, a new residential landscape began to take 
shape in metropolitan areas, with large numbers of people commuting into cities for 
work and then back to  homes  in the  suburbs. (Increasingly as the  postwar era 
progressed, suburbanites worked, not just lived, outside cities.) 
Less explored by historians and slower to develop historically was the restruc- 
turing of  the  consumer  marketplace that  accompanied the  suburbanization of 
residential life. New suburbanites who had themselves grown up in urban neigh- 
borhoods  walking  to  corner  stores  and  taking  public  transportation to  shop 
downtown  were  now  contending  with  changed  conditions.  Only  in  the  most 
ambitious suburban tracts built after the  war did developers  incorporate retail 
stores into their plans. In those  cases,  developers tended  to place the shopping 
district at the core of the residential community, much as it had been in the pre-war 
planned community of Radburn, New Jersey, and in the earliest shopping centers, 
such as Kansas City's Country Club Plaza of the 1920s. These precedents, and their 
descendents in early postwar developments in Park Forest, Illinois, Levittown, New 
York, and Bergenfield, New Jersey, replicated the structure of the old-style urban 
community, where shopping was part of the public space at the settlement's core 
and  residences  spread  outward  from  there.4  But  most  new  suburban home 
developers  made no  effort to  provide for residents' commercial needs.  Rather, 
suburbanites were  expected  to  fend  for  themselves  by  driving to  the  existing 
2 See Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass  Frontier:  The Suburbanization  of the United  States (New York, 
1985); Robert Fishman, Bourgeois Utopias: The Rise and Fall of Suburbia (New  York, 1987); Joel 
Garreau, Edge City:  Life on the New Frontier  (Garden City, N.Y., 1991); William Sharpe and Leonard 
Wallock, "Bold New City or Built-Up 'Burb? Redefining Contemporary  Suburbia,"  with comments by 
Robert Bruegmann, Robert Fishman, Margaret  Marsh, and June Manning  Thomas,  American Quarterly 
46 (March 1994): 1-61;  Carol O'Connor, "Sorting Out Suburbia,"  American Quarterly  37 (Summer 
1985): 382-94. 
3 The Editors of Fortune, The Changing  American Market (Garden City, N.Y.,  1995), 76. 
4 Ann Durkin Keating and Ruth Eckdish Knack, "Shopping in the Planned Community:  Evolution 
of the Park Forest Town Center," unpublished paper in possession of author; Howard Gillette, Jr., 
"The Evolution of the Planned Shopping Center in Suburb and City,"  American Planning  Association 
Joumal 51 (Autumn 1985): 449-60; Daniel Prosser, "The New Downtowns: Commercial Architecture 
in Suburban  New Jersey, 1920-1970," in Joel Schwartz and Daniel Prosser, Cities of the Garden  State: 
Essays in the Urban  and Suburban  History  of New Jersey  (Dubuque, Iowa, 1977), 113-15; "Park  Forest 
Moves into '52," House and Home: The Magazine of Building 1 (March 1952): 115-16; William S. 
Worley, J. C. Nichols and the Shaping of Kansas City:  Innovation in Planned Residential Communities 
(Columbia, Mo., 1990); Richard Longstreth, "J. C. Nichols, the Country Club Plaza, and Notions of 
Modernity," The Harvard  Architecture  Review, Vol. 5: Precedent and Invention (New  York,  1986), 
121-32; William H. Whyte, Jr., "The Outgoing Life," Fortune 47 (July 1953): 85; Michael Birkner,  A 
Country  Place No More: The Transformation  of Bergenfield,  New Jersey,  1894-1994  (Rutherford, N.J., 
1994), 174-77; Bergen  Evening Record, Special Foster Village Edition, August 10, 1949. 
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"market towns," which often offered the only commerce for miles, or by returning 
to the city to shop. Faced with slim retail offerings nearby, many new suburbanites 
of the 1940s and 1950s continued to depend on the city for major purchases, making 
do with the small, locally owned commercial outlets in neighboring towns only for 
minor needs. 
It would not be until the mid-1950s that a new market structure appropriate to 
this  suburbanized,  mass-consumption  society  prevailed.  Important  precedents 
existed in the branch department stores and prototypical shopping centers con- 
structed between the 1920s and 1940s in outlying city neighborhoods and in older 
suburban communities, which began the  process of  decentralizing retail dollars 
away from downtown. But now the scale was much larger. Even more significant, 
the  absence  or  inadequacy of  town  centers  at  a  time  of  enormous  suburban 
population growth offered commercial developers a unique opportunity to reimag- 
ine community life with their private projects at its heart.5 
By the early 1950s, large merchandisers  were aggressively  reaching out to the new 
suburbanites, whose buying power was even greater than their numbers.6 The 30 
million  people  that  Fortune magazine  counted  as  suburban residents  in  1953 
represented 19 percent of the U.S. population but 29 percent of its income. They 
had higher median incomes and homeownership rates, as well as more children 
fourteen and under than the rest of the metropolitan population, all indicators of 
high consumption. 
Merchandisers also  realized that postwar suburbanites were  finally living the 
motorized existence that had been predicted for American society since the 1920s. 
As consumers became dependent on, virtually inseparable from, their cars, traffic 
congestion  and parking problems  discouraged commercial expansion in  central 
business districts of cities and smaller market towns, already hindered by a short 
supply of  developable  space.7 Reaching  out  to  suburbanites where  they  lived, 
merchandisers at first built stores along the new highways, in commercial "strips" 
that consumers could easily reach by car. By the mid-1950s, however, commercial 
developers-many  of whom owned department stores-were  constructing a new 
kind of marketplace, the regional shopping center aimed at satisfying suburbanites' 
consumption and community needs. Strategically located at highway intersections 
or along the busiest thoroughfares, the regional shopping center attracted patrons 
living within half an hour's drive, who could come by car, park in the abundant lots 
provided, and then proceed on foot (although there was usually some bus service as 
well). Here was the "new city" of the postwar era, a vision of how community space 
5 Jackson, Crabgrass  Frontier,  255-61.  On precedents in the pre-World War II period, see Richard 
Longstreth, "Silver Spring: Georgia Avenue,  Colesville Road,  and the  Creation of  an Alternative 
'Downtown' for Metropolitan Washington," in Streets: Critical Perspectives  on Public Space, Zeynep 
Celik, Diane  Favro, and Richard Ingersoll, eds.  (Berkeley, Calif., 1994), 247-57;  Longstreth, "The 
Neighborhood Shopping Center in Washington, D.C., 1930-1941," Journal of the Society of Architec- 
tural  Historians  51 (March 1992): 5-33; Longstreth, "The Perils of a Parkless Town," in The Car  and the 
City: The Automobile, the Built Environment, and Daily  Urban Life,  Martin Wachs and Margaret 
Crawford, eds. (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1992), 141-53. 
6  Editors of Fortune, Changing  American Market, 78-80,  90. Also see "New Need  Cited on Store 
Centers," New York Times (February 13, 1955): 7. 
7 Richard Longstreth, "The Mixed Blessings of Success: The Hecht Company  and Department Store 
Branch Development  after World War II," Occasional Paper No.  14, January 1995, Center  for 
Washington Area Studies, George Washington University. 
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should be  constructed in  an economy  and society  built  on  mass consumption. 
Well-designed  regional  shopping  centers  would  provide  the  ideal  core  for  a 
settlement that grew by adding residential nodes off of major roadways rather than 
concentric rings from downtown, as in cities  and earlier suburban communities. 
After  spending  several  months  in  the  late  1950s  visiting  these  "modern-day 
downtowns," Women's  Wear  Daily columnist Samuel Feinberg was moved to invoke 
Lincoln Steffens's proclamation on his return from the Soviet Union in the 1920s: 
"I have seen the future and it works."8 
This essay will analyze the larger social and political implications of the shift in 
community marketplace from town center to shopping center. Although I draw on 
national evidence, I pay special attention to the case of Paramus, New Jersey, a 
postwar suburb seven miles from the  George  Washington Bridge that sprouted 
virtually overnight in the vegetable fields of Bergen County and became the home 
of  the largest shopping complex in the country by the end of  1957.9 Within six 
months, R. H. Macy's Garden State Plaza and Allied Stores Corporation's Bergen 
Mall opened three quarters of a mile from each other at the intersection of Routes 
4, 17, and the soon-to-be-completed Garden State Parkway.  Both department store 
managements had independently recognized the enormous commercial potential of 
Bergen and Passaic counties; although the George Washington Bridge connected 
the  area to  Manhattan in  1931, the  Depression  and the war postponed  major 
housing construction until the late 1940s. By 1960, each shopping center had two to 
three department stores as anchors (distinguishing it from many pre-war projects 
built  around  a  single  anchor),  surrounded by  fifty to  seventy  smaller  stores. 
Attracting half a million patrons a week, these shopping centers dominated retail 
trade in the region.10  (See Figures 1 and 2.) 
The Paramus malls have special significance because of their location adjacent to 
the wealthiest and busiest central business district in the nation. If these malls could 
prosper in the shadow of Manhattan, the success of their counterparts elsewhere 
should come as no surprise. Moreover, the Paramus case illuminates three major 
effects of shifting marketplaces on postwar American community life: in commer- 
8 Samuel Feinberg, "Story  of Shopping Centers," What  Makes Shopping  Centers  Tick, reprinted from 
Women's Wear  Daily (New York, 1960), 1. For useful background on the development of  regional 
shopping centers, see William Severini Kowinski, The  Malling of America:  An Inside Look at the Great 
Consumer Paradise (New  York,  1985); Neil  Harris, Cultural Excursions: Marketing  Appetites and 
Cultural  Tastes  in Modern  America (Chicago, 1990), 7, 76-77, 278-88; Margaret Crawford,  "The World 
in a Shopping Mall," in Michael Sorkin, ed., Variations  on a Theme  Park: The New American City  and 
the End of Public Space (New York, 1992), 3-30; Gillette, "Evolution of the Planned Shopping Center." 
9 On the postwar growth of Paramus and Bergen County, see  Raymond M. Ralph, Farmland to 
Suburbia, 1920-1960,  Vol. 6, Bergen County, New Jersey History and Heritage Series (Hackensack, 
N.J., 1983), 62-71, 76-90; Catherine M. Fogarty, John E. O'Connor, and Charles F. Cummings,  Bergen 
County:  A Pictorial  History (Norfolk, Va., 1985), 182-93; Beautiful Bergen:  The Story  of Bergen County, 
New Jersey, 1962; Patricia M. Ryle, An  Economic Profile of Bergen County, New Jersey (Office of 
Economic  Research,  Division  of  Planning and Research,  New  Jersey Department  of  Labor and 
Industry, March 1980); League of  Women Voters of  Bergen County, Where Can I Live in Bergen 
County:  Factors  Affecting  Housing Supply (Closter, N.J., 1972). 
10 Feinberg, What Makes Shopping Centers Tick, 2, 94-102;  Ralph, Farmland to Suburbia, 70-71, 
84-85; Mark  A. Stuart, Our  Era, 1960-Present, Vol. 7, Bergen County, New Jersey History and Heritage 
Series (Hackensack, N.J., 1983), 19-22; Prosser, "New Downtowns," 119-20; Edward T. Thompson, 
"The  Suburb That  Macy's Built," Fortune 61  (February 1960):  195-200;  "Garden State  Plaza 
Merchant's Manual," May 1, 1957, and certain pages revised in 1959, 1960, 1962, 1963, 1965, 1969, 
Garden State Plaza Historical Collection. 
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FIGURE 2: This aerial  view of the Garden  State Plaza  in Paramus,  New Jersey,  shows  its orientation  to the car. 
Note its convenient  location at the intersection  of Routes 4 and 17 and the Garden  State Parkway,  as well as 
the extensive  space allocated  for parking.  Courtesy  of Garden  State Plaza Historical  Collection. 
community forums; and in feminizing public space, they enhanced women's claim 
on  the  suburban landscape but also empowered them more  as consumers than 
producers. 
WHEN  PLANNERS  AND  SHOPPING-CENTER  DEVELOPERs envisioned this new kind of 
consumption-oriented community center in the 1950s, they set out to perfect the 
concept  of  downtown, not  to  obliterate  it,  even  though  their  projects directly 
challenged  the viability of  existing commercial centers such as Hackensack, the 
political and commercial seat of Bergen County. It is easy to overlook this visionary 
dimension  and  focus  only  on  the  obvious  commercial motives  developers  and 
investors shared. Of course, developers, department stores,and  big investors such 
as insurance companies (who leapt at the promise of  a huge return on the vast 
amounts of capital they controlled) were pursuing the enormous potential for profit 
in shopping-center development.11 But they also believed that they were partici- 
pating in a rationalization of consumption and community no less significant than 
11 On the financing of shopping centers and the great profits involved, see Jerry  Jacobs, The  Mall:  An 
Attempted  Escape from Everyday  Life (Prospect Heights, Ill., 1984), 52. 
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the  way  highways were  improving transportation or  tract  developments  were 
delivering mass housing. 
The ideal was still the creation of  centrally located public space that brought 
together commercial and civic activity. Victor Gruen, one of the most prominent 
and articulate shopping-center developers, spoke for many others when he argued 
that shopping centers offered  to  dispersed suburban populations "crystallization 
points for suburbia's  community life." "By affording opportunities for social life and 
recreation  in  a  protected  pedestrian  environment,  by  incorporating civic  and 
educational facilities, shopping centers can fill an existing void."'12  Not  only did 
Gruen and others promote the construction of community centers in the atomized 
landscape of suburbia,  but in appearance their earliest shopping centers idealized- 
almost  romanticized-the  physical plan  of  the  traditional  downtown shopping 
street, with stores lining both sides of  an open-air pedestrian walkway that was 
landscaped and equipped with benches.13 (See Figure 3.) 
While bringing many of the best qualities of urban life to the suburbs, these new 
"shopping towns," as Gruen called them, also sought to overcome the "anarchy  and 
ugliness" characteristic of many American cities. A centrally owned and managed 
Garden State Plaza or Bergen Mall, it was argued, offered an alternative model to 
the inefficiencies, visual chaos, and provinciality of traditional downtown districts. 
A  centralized  administration  made  possible  the  perfect  mix  and  "scientific" 
placement  of  stores,  meeting  customers'  diverse  needs  and  maximizing store 
owners' profits. Management kept control visually by standardizing all architectural 
and graphic design and politically by requiring all tenants to  participate in the 
tenants'  association.  Common  complaints of  downtown shoppers were  directly 
addressed: parking was  plentiful,  safety was  ensured  by hired  security guards, 
delivery tunnels and loading courts kept truck traffic away from shoppers, canopied 
walks and air-conditioned stores made shopping comfortable year 'round, piped-in 
background music replaced the  cacophony of  the  street. The preponderance of 
chains and franchises over local stores, required by big investors such as insurance 
companies, brought shoppers the latest national trends in products and merchan- 
dising  techniques.  B.  Earl  Puckett,  Allied  Stores'  board  chair,  boasted  that 
Paramus's model  shopping centers were  making it  "one of  the  first preplanned 
major cities in America."'14  What made this new market structure so unique and 
appealing to businessmen like Puckett was that it encouraged social innovation 
while maximizing profit. 
Garden State Plaza and Bergen  Mall provide good  models  for how shopping 
12  Victor Gruen, "Introverted  Architecture,"  ProgressiveArchitecture  38, no. 5 (1957): 204-08; Victor 
Gruen and Larry Smith, Shopping Towns USA: The Planning of Shopping Centers (New York, 1960), 
22-24; both quoted in Gillette, "Evolution of the Planned Shopping Center." For more on Gruen, see 
Kowinski, Malling of America,  118-20,  210-14;  "Exhibit of  Shopping Centers," New  York Times 
(October 19, 1954): 42. Paul Goldberger recently profiled shopping-center builder Martin Bucksbaum 
in "Settling the Suburban Frontier,"  New York Times  Magazine (December 31, 1995): 34-35. 
13  Robert Bruegmann made the same point about the way the earliest design of suburban shopping 
centers resembled downtown shopping streets in a talk to the Urban History Seminar of the Chicago 
Historical Society, February 17, 1994. 
14  Quoted in Feinberg, What  Makes Shopping  Centers  Tick, 101. In addition to sources already cited 
on  the  control  possible  in  a  shopping  center  versus  a  downtown, see  "Shopping Centers  Get 
'Personality,'" New York Times (June 29, 1958): 1. 
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FIGURE 4: The in-house publication  Penney  News (November-December  1958) published  this photo as part 
of a feature story on the recent opening  of J. C. Penney's  Garden State Plaza store. The caption read, "This 
community  club room which can also serve as selling area will be made available  free of charge  to women's 
clubs  and civic groups."  Penney's  created  this community  club room, its first  ever, as part  of the campaign  to 
make  the shopping  center  the heart  of suburban  life. P-N.J.,  Paramus-1  1. Courtesy  of JCPenney  Archives  and 
Historical  Museum,  Dallas, Texas. 
hearing aids, tires, even religious objects. Services grew to include restaurants, a 
post office, laundromat, cleaners, key store, shoe repair, bank, loan company, stock 
brokerage houses,  barber shop,  travel  agency, real  estate  office,  "slenderizing 
salon," and Catholic chapel. Recreational facilities ranged from a 550-seat movie 
theater, bowling alley, and ice-skating rink to  a children's gymnasium and play- 
ground. 
Both  shopping  centers  made  meeting  rooms  and  auditoriums  available  to 
community organizations and scheduled a full range of cultural and educational 
activities to legitimize these sites as civic centers, which also attracted customers. 
(See Figure 4.) Well-attended programs and exhibitions taught shoppers about such 
"hot" topics of the 1950s and 1960s as space exploration, color television, modern 
art, and civics. Evening concerts and plays, ethnic entertainment, dances and classes 
for teenagers, campaign appearances by electoral candidates, community outreach 
for local charities: these were some of the ways that the Bergen Mall and Garden 
State Plaza made themselves indispensable to life in Bergen County. In sum, it was 
hard to think of consumer items or community events that could not be found at 
one or the other of these two shopping centers. (In the 1970s, a cynical reporter 
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cracked that "the only institution that had not yet invaded" the modern shopping 
mall was the funeral home.) Furthermore, stores and services were more accessible 
than those downtown, as the centers were open to patrons from 10 a.m. to 9:30 p.m., 
at first four nights a week and by the 1960s, six nights a week. To a regional planner 
such as Ernest Erber, these postwar shopping centers helped construct a new kind 
of urbanism appropriate to the automobile age: the "City  of Bergen," he named the 
area in 1960. The New York Times agreed, remarking of the Paramus commercial 
complex, "It lives a night as well as a day existence, glittering like a city when the 
sun goes down."'15 
When developers and store owners set out to make the shopping center a more 
perfect downtown, they aimed to exclude from this public space unwanted urban 
groups such as vagrants, prostitutes, racial minorities, and poor people.  Market 
segmentation became  the  guiding principle of  this mix of  commercial and civic 
activity, as the shopping center sought perhaps contradictorily to legitimize itself as 
a true community center and to define that community in exclusionary socioeco- 
nomic and racial terms. The simple demographics of postwar America helped: when 
nine of the ten largest cities in the United States lost population between 1950 and 
1960 while all metropolitan areas grew, three whites were moving out for every two 
non-whites  who  moved  in,  laying  the  groundwork for  the  racially polarized 
metropolitan populations of today.16  In this way, suburbanization must be seen as 
a new form of racial segregation in the face of a huge wave of African-American 
migration from the South to the North during the 1950s. 
Shopping  centers  did  not  exclude  inadvertently by virtue  of  their  suburban 
location.  Rather,  developers  deliberately defined  their  communities  through a 
combination of marketing and policing. Macy's reminded its stockholders in 1955 
as it was building its first shopping center, the  Garden State Plaza, "We are a 
type of organization that caters primarily  to middle-income groups, and our stores 
15  Ernest Erber, "Notes on the 'City of Bergen,"' September 14, 1960, Box B, Ernest Erber Papers 
(hereafter, Erber), Newark Public Library (hereafter, NPL), Newark; "Paramus Booms as a Store 
Center,"  New York  Times (February  5, 1962): 33-34; "The Mall the Merrier, or Is It?"  New York  Times 
(November 21, 1976): 62. For details on particular stores and activities at Bergen Mall and Garden 
State Plaza, see Feinberg, What  Makes Shopping Centers Tick, 97-100; Fogarty, et al., Bergen County, 
189; Prosser, "New Downtowns," 119. Almost every issue of the Bergen  Evening  Record from 1957 and 
thereafter yields valuable material (in  articles and  advertisements) on  mall  stores,  services, and 
activities. The discussion here is based particularly on issues from November 8,  13, and 19, 1957, 
January  8, 1958, June 10, 1959, and March 2, 1960. Also see "Shoppers! Mass Today on Level 1,"  New 
York  Times, June 14, 1994; press release on Garden State Plaza's opening in the Historical Collection 
of Garden State Plaza, folder "GSP history";  "It Won't Be Long Now ..  . Bamberger's, New Jersey's 
Greatest Store, Comes to Paramus Soon," promotional leaflet, stamped August 22, 1956, file "Bergen 
County Shopping Centers," Johnson Free Public Library,  Hackensack, N.J.; "The Shopping Center," 
New York Times (February 1, 1976): 6-7. 
For data on the allocation of shopping-center space in ten regional shopping centers in 1957, see 
William Applebaum and S. 0.  Kaylin, Case Studies  in Shopping  Center  Development  and Operation  (New 
York, 1974), 101. For evidence of the  community orientation of  shopping centers nationwide, see 
Arthur Herzog,  "Shops, Culture, Centers-and  More," New York Times Magazine (November  18, 
1962): 34-35,  109-10,  112-14; in the New York Times: "A Shopping Mall in Suffolk Offering More 
Than Goods," June 22, 1970: 39; "Supermarkets  Hub of Suburbs,"  February  7, 1971: 58; "Busy Day in 
a Busy Mall," April 12, 1972: 55. On the community-relations efforts of branch stores, see Clinton L. 
Oaks, Managing  Suburban  Branches of Department  Stores (Stanford, Calif., 1957), 81-83. 
16 George Sternlieb, The Future of the Downtown Department  Store (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), 10. 
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reflect this in the merchandise they carry and in their physical surroundings."'17  It 
was this concern for "physical  surroundings"  that made the setting of the suburban 
shopping center  appealing to  retailers-and  ultimately to  customers. As  Balti- 
more's Planning Council explained more  explicitly than merchants ever would, 
"Greater numbers of  low-income,  Negro  shoppers in  Central Business  District 
stores, coming at the same time as middle and upper income white shoppers are 
given alternatives in ...  segregated suburban centers, has had unfortunate impli- 
cations [for downtown shopping]."918 
Store selection, merchandise, prices, and carefully controlled access to suburban 
shopping  centers  supported  the  class  and  color  line.  A  survey of  consumer 
expenditures in northern New Jersey in 1960-1961 revealed that while 79 percent 
of all families owned cars, fewer than one-third of those with incomes below $3,000 
did, and the  low-income population included a higher percentage of  non-white 
families  than  the  average  for  the  whole  sample.19 Although  bus  service  was 
available for shoppers without cars, only a tiny proportion arrived  that way (in 1966, 
a daily average of only 600 people came to the Garden State Plaza by bus compared 
to a mid-week daily average of 18,000 cars and a holiday peak of 31,000 cars, many 
carrying  more than one passenger), and bus routes were carefully planned to serve 
non-driving customers-particularly  women-from  neighboring suburbs, not low- 
income consumers from cities such as Passaic, Paterson, and Newark.20  Whereas 
individual department stores had long targeted particular markets defined by class 
and race, selling, for example, to "the carriage trade" at the upper end, shopping 
centers applied market segmentation on the scale of a downtown. In promoting an 
idealized downtown, shopping centers like Garden State Plaza and Bergen Mall 
tried to filter out not only the inefficiencies and inconveniences of the city but also 
the undesirable people who lived there. 
17 R. H. Macy & Company,  Annual Report (New York, 1955). The Times-Advocate,  March 14, 1976, 
argues that Bamberger's, Macy's store at the Garden State Plaza, was at the forefront of the chain's 
appeal to the middle to upper-income shopper. On market segmentation of shopping centers, also see 
William H. Whyte, Jr., The Organization  Man (New York, 1956), 316-17; Jacobs, The Mall, 5, 12; and 
Albert Bills and Lois Pratt, "Personality Differences among Shopping Centers," Fairleigh  Dickinson 
University  Business Review 1 (Winter 1961), which distinguishes between the customers of the Bergen 
Mall and Garden State Plaza in socioeconomic terms. Crawford's "World in a Shopping Mall," in 
Sorkin, Variations  on a Theme  Park, discusses the sophisticated strategies that market researchers use 
to analyze trade areas and pitch stores to different kinds of customers, 8-9. 
18 George Sternlieb, "The Future of Retailing in the Downtown Core,"  AIP Journal 24 (May 1963), 
as reprinted in Howard A. Schretter, Downtown Revitalization  (Athens, Ga., 1967), 95, and quoted in 
Jon C. Teaford, The Rough Road to Renaissance: Urban Revitalization  in America, 1940-1985  (Bal- 
timore, Md., 1990), 129. 
19  United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Consumer Expenditures and 
Income, Northern New Jersey, 1960-61," BLS Report No. 237-63, December 1963, Schomburg  Center, 
New York Public Library,  Clipping File "Consumer Expenses & Income-NJ." 
20 "The Wonder on Routes 4 and 17: Garden State Plaza," brochure, file "Bergen County Shopping 
Centers," Johnson Free Public Library,  Hackensack, New Jersey; "Notes on Discussion Dealing with 
Regional (Intermunicipal) Planning Program for Passaic Valley Area (Lower Portion of Passaic Co. 
and South Bergen," n.d., Box A, Folder 3, Erber, NPL; "Memorandum  to DAJ and WBS from EE," 
November 22, 1966, Box B, Erber, NPL; National Center for Telephone Research (A Division of Louis 
Harris and Associates), "A Study of Shoppers' Attitudes toward the Proposed Shopping Mall in the 
Hudson  County Meadowlands Area,"  conducted  for  Hartz Mountain Industries, February 1979, 
Special Collections, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey. 
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IF  DEVELOPERS  AND  RETAILERS ENVISIONED  the regional shopping center as the new 
American city of postwar suburbia, what actually happened? How successful were 
shopping centers in attracting patrons and displacing existing urban centers? By 
investigating the behavior of consumers, on the one hand, and retail businessmen 
on the other, we can assess the impact of Bergen Mall and Garden State Plaza on 
the commercial and community life of Bergen County. 
Consumer surveys of the late 1950s and early 1960s, carried out by sociologists 
and market researchers interested in evaluating the changes wrought by the new 
regional shopping centers, provide a remarkably  good picture of consumer behavior 
in the era. Before the Bergen Mall and Garden State Plaza opened in 1957, Bergen 
County shoppers satisfied their immediate needs on the main streets of Hackensack 
and of smaller surrounding towns such as Ridgewood, Fair Lawn, Bergenfield, and 
Englewood. For more extensive shopping, people went to branches of Sears and 
Arnold Constable in Hackensack, Meyer Brothers and Quackenbush's department 
stores in Paterson, Bamberger's, Hahne's, and Kresge's in Newark, and quite often 
to the big stores in Manhattan. Even before the regional shopping centers opened, 
the huge influx of new suburban dwellers had raised retail sales in Bergen County 
from $400 million in 1948 to $700 million in 1954, an increase of 79 percent; by 
1958, sales had increased another 23 percent to $866 million. Nonetheless, Bergen 
County residents in 1954 were still spending $650 million outside the county, almost 
as much as inside.21 
Samuel and Lois Pratt, professors at Fairleigh Dickinson University, surveyed 
Bergen County consumers living within a ten-minute drive of the two new shopping 
centers in 1957, 1958, and 1959 to follow changes in their shopping habits over time. 
Prior to  the  opening  of  the  shopping  centers,  seven  in  ten  suburban families 
surveyed shopped in New York City to some  extent. One year after the centers 
opened, the numbers shopping in New York dropped to six in ten, and two years 
after, fewer than five in ten families shopped there at all. In other words, one-fourth 
of the entire sample formerly had shopped in New York City but had now entirely 
stopped. The loss was even more substantial than that; the 15 percent of suburban 
families who formerly did most of their shopping in New York City-people  the 
Pratts labeled "major  shoppers"-showed  the sharpest decline, 50 percent by 1958, 
80 percent by 1959. Moreover, those who continued to shop in New York City were 
spending much less money there; the average annual expenditure in New York by 
suburban families dropped from $93 to  $68 after the regional shopping centers 
opened. Furthermore, consumers were much less likely to shop in the New York 
stores that had opened suburban branches; by the end of the first year, the number 
of  Bergen County families who  had traded in the  New  York Macy's or Stern's 
dropped by half. A  similar study of  1,100 shoppers by the New York University 
School of Retailing confirmed the Pratts' findings: shoppers for women's wear were 
half as likely to go to New York and a third as likely to go to Hackensack just one 
year after the shopping centers had opened. By the early 1960s, a survey of New 
York area shoppers by a Harvard Business School professor concluded that more 
than 80 percent of residents of the New Jersey suburbs were most likely to shop 
21 Stuart, Our Era, 20; Lois Pratt, "The Impact of Regional Shopping Centers in Bergen County," 
unpublished conference paper delivered April 23, 1960, in possession of the author. 
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close to home for clothing and household items, while only 20 percent went most 
often to Manhattan and 38 percent to New Jersey cities. (Some multiple answers 
brought the total over 100 percent.) Nationwide, the trend was the same; retail sales 
in central business districts declined dramatically between  1958 and 1963, while 
overall metropolitan sales mushroomed from 10 to 20 percent.22 
The  reasons consumers routinely gave for  shifting from downtown stores  to 
shopping centers varied, but the  overwhelming motivation they  articulated was 
convenience-the  ability to drive and park easily, more night hours, improved store 
layouts, increased self-selection,  and simplified credit like the charge plate. The 
Pratts concluded that shoppers were not so much dissatisfied with New York and 
Hackensack stores  as attracted to  the  ease  and "progressiveness" of  shopping- 
center  shopping.  People  seemed  to  share the  developers'  sense  that  shopping 
centers were the modern way to consume.23 
While overall patronage of stores in surrounding downtowns declined as shop- 
ping-center patronage increased, researchers discovered that the story was not so 
simple; some local stores were benefiting as Bergen County residents became less 
dependent  on  New  York.  Small  purchases  that  shoppers  would  have  made 
alongside larger ones  in New York were now handled closer to home,  often  in 
locally owned shops in small downtowns. A large town like Hackensack, however, 
did not benefit as much as a Ridgewood or Englewood, since it was being displaced 
as a major shopping site by the shopping centers, and its stores were less likely to 
foster the same kind of loyalty to merchants as shops in small towns. In fact, within 
a year of the shopping centers' opening, major shoppers used Hackensack a third 
less; as a consequence,  50 percent of  the  retail establishments on  Main Street 
reported they had done less business than the previous year. By 1960, 10 percent of 
the  stores  on  Hackensack's Main Street  had closed  from competition.  Bergen 
County residents were restructuring  their consumption patterns by substituting the 
new shopping centers  for New  York  and for closer,  large shopping towns like 
v  22 Samuel Pratt and Lois Pratt, "The Impact of  Some  Regional  Shopping Centers," Journal of 
Marketing  25 (October 1960): 44-50;  Samuel Pratt, "The Challenge to Retailing," an address to the 
1957 Annual Meeting of the Passaic Valley Citizens Planning Association, April 24, 1957, in possession 
of the author; L. Pratt, "Impact of Regional Shopping Centers in Bergen County";  Samuel Pratt and 
James Moran, "How the Regional Shopping Centers May Affect Shopping Habits in Rochelle Park 
(Preliminary)," Business Research Bulletin  1,  Bureau  of  Business  Research,  Fairleigh  Dickinson 
University (1956); New York University study cited in Thompson, "Suburb  That Macy's Built," 196, 
200; Regional Plan Association, Committee on the Second Regional Plan, "Work Book for Work- 
shops," Princeton, N.J., May 25-26,  1966, Box D, pp. V-7-9,  Erber, NPL; Stuart U. Rich, Shopping 
Behavior  of Department  Store Customers:  A Study  of Store  Policies and Customer  Demand, with  Particular 
Reference to Delivery Service and  Telephone Ordering (Boston,  1963), esp.  133-56,  228; Plan One 
Research Corporation,  New York City, for the Bergen Evening Record Corporation, The  Mighty  Market 
(Hackensack, N.J.,  1971). For national statistics on  the  decline  of  retail sales  in central business 
districts while they mushroomed in metropolitan areas between 1958 and 1963, see Teaford, Rough 
Road to Renaissance, 129-31. 
23 Pratt and Moran, "How the Regional Shopping Centers May Affect Shopping Habits in Rochelle 
Park";  Pratt, "Challenge to Retailing," 13-15. For surveys of consumers outside of the New York area, 
see  C. T. Jonassen, Downtown versus Suburban Shopping, Ohio Marketing Studies, The Ohio State 
University Special Bulletin Number X-58 (Columbus, Ohio, 1953); Sternlieb, Future of the Downtown 
Department Store, 33, 131-33; Rich, Shopping Behavior of Department Store Customers; and several 
important studies described in Pratt, "Challenge to Retailing," 15-19. 
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FIGURE  5 
Hackensack, while continuing to  shop-mostly  for convenience  goods  and serv- 
ices-in  the small town centers near their homes.24 (See Figure 5.) 
While it is hard to  evaluate the  extent to which people  viewed the  shopping 
centers as more than places to shop-as  community centers-anecdotal  evidence 
suggests that they did. Many reporters writing stories in the late 1950s and 1960s on 
the way malls were becoming central to the nation's culture made this point, and 
they routinely introduced their readers to people like Ernest J. Weinhold, a retired 
designer, who said that he and his wife came to the Cherry Hill Mall in southern 
New Jersey four days a week. "I love it here-there  are things going on that you 
don't find anywhere else. I don't shop every day but what I do buy I get here."25  The 
general manager of Willowbrook Mall, a shopping center not far from Paramus, 
explained that the Ernest Weinholds of the suburban  world made it easy to program 
activities about forty-five weeks a year. "Whether it's charity fairs, 4-H exhibits, 
meetings of the Weight-Watchers or the concert by the local barbershop quartet, 
we find that people respond-and  that's what counts."26  In the new public place of 
the shopping center, consuming and leisure were becoming inseparably  intertwined, 
24 See all the Pratt studies listed in note 22, as well as "Hackensack  Faces Year of Decision," Bergen 
Evening Record (January 10, 1958): 47. 
25 Herzog, "Shops, Culture, Centers-And  More," 110, quote on 114. 
26 "The Shopping Centers," New York Times (February 1, 1976): 7. 
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constructing community experiences around the cultural tastes of white middle- 
class suburbanites. 
The response of businessmen in the existent town centers of northern New Jersey 
provides further evidence of the crisis confronting local retailers with the arrival of 
the shopping centers in the late  1950s. As the openings of the Bergen Mall and 
Garden State Plaza neared, and particularly once they were a reality, Main Street 
retailers in Hackensack, Paterson, and other shopping towns told interviewers that 
they knew they had to improve their own stores and work cooperatively with other 
merchants to promote downtown. In 1957, Hackensack's Chamber of Commerce 
launched  the  first of  many campaigns to  make  shopping in  Hackensack more 
attractive,  featuring  the  covering  of  downtown  meters  at  Christmas time  so 
customers could park free.  Paterson, four miles  away, formed the  Commercial 
Development  Fund  for  Paterson's  Future,  which  raised  $65,000  to  promote 
downtown through marketing and advertising; at the  same time, the  Municipal 
Parking  Authority issued $1.8 million in bonds to double the capacity of Paterson's 
downtown parking lots, raising the total to 800. (By contrast, each shopping center 
offered parking for more than 8,000 cars!) 
Despite the best of intentions to ease parking and traffic, make downtown safer, 
improve customer service, cooperate  in promoting downtown shopping, expand 
merchandise,  modernize  stores,  and  strengthen  community ties,  merchants in 
Bergen County's town centers had a tough time. Organizing cooperative campaigns 
of merchants who by identity and practice were independent was extremely difficult. 
Chambers of  Commerce  and  similar entities  lacked  the  coercive,  centralized 
authority of  shopping-center managements. One  downtown's promotional cam- 
paign, unfortunately, was more likely to draw shoppers away from another town in 
crisis than from the  shopping centers. Paterson's gain through the  Commercial 
Development Fund for Paterson's Future, for example, turned out to be neighbor- 
ing Fair Lawn's loss, as retail sales there dropped to half their 1954 level by the end 
of 1958. In the specific case of Hackensack, moreover, the Pratts found in a study 
of Bergen County retailers that even before the shopping centers opened, the city 
was in relative decline; although total retail sales grew along with the exploding 
suburban population, Hackensack's share of  the  county market decreased from 
about 20 to 16 percent between 1948 and 1954. Hence, the shopping centers were 
only the latest blow to provincial merchants who had not figured out how to prosper 
in a world undergoing so much social and cultural change.27 
27 The  discussion  in  the  two  previous  paragraphs on  the  response  of  local  businessmen  to 
shopping-center development is based on the following sources: "From  Now On-Until  When?"  Bergen 
Evening Record (December 6, 1957): 6; "Bergen Shoppers Shun New York," Bergen Evening Record 
(December 19, 1957): 1; "Main Street Making Comeback in Duel with Shopping Centers," New York 
Times (May 31, 1962): 1; "Malls  Threaten Downtown Suburbia,"  New York  Times  (December 20, 1972): 
92; Samuel Pratt and Lois Pratt, Suburban  Downtown in Transition:  A Problem in Business Change in 
Bergen  County,  New Jersey  (Rutherford, N.J., 1958); L. Pratt, "Impact  of Regional Shopping Centers in 
Bergen County." 
Articles on Hackensack merchants' struggle to compete include, in the Bergen  Evening Record, "A 
City with Faith: Hackensack Grows," October 29,  1957: 19; "Alma [Anderson-Linden Merchants 
Association] Continues to Work to Better Shopping Area," December 2, 1957: 35; "The Way of Alma," 
December 7, 1957: 28; "Life Line to a City's Future: Hackensack Must Plan, Promote," January 10, 
1958: 35; "How to Stimulate Business," January 10, 1958: 42; "What's  Ahead for Hackensack Business 
in '58," January 10, 1958: 48; "So the Fight Is Worth Making,"  January 10, 1958: 58; "Work  Together 
AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW  OCTOBER 1996 From Town Center to Shopping Center  1065 
Recognizing the limits of what they could do alone, or through their volunteer 
merchants' organizations, local Bergen County retailers endorsed two strategies for 
improving their situation, both of which mobilized the authority and resources of 
government on  their behalf.  First, they joined  a  coalition  of  other  interests- 
including churches and citizens concerned with traffic congestion-to  pass blue 
laws prohibiting Sunday sales. If the shopping centers were allowed to open  on 
Sunday, small, family-run stores for whom a seven-day week was a great hardship 
would suffer a handicap. If all stores were required to close, the score would be 
somewhat even.  "It's easy for the  big stores  to  open,  but it's different for  the 
independents," explained  the  owner  of  a  men's  clothing  store  in  Hackensack, 
adding that he and most of his staff of ten worked six days a week. "We are truly 
a service store, which consists of all full-time people.  If you open seven days, you 
might have to hire part-timers. Our customers want to find a familiar face. They 
don't want to  hear that the person they expect to  see  is off  today."28  The best 
defense that downtown retailers had against the shopping centers-service-would 
thus be jeopardized. 
Losing no time, Paramus prohibited Sunday sales of virtually all goods except 
"necessities" (food,  drugs, gasoline, newspapers) in  1957, the year the shopping 
centers opened; violators were subject to a $200 fine per offense or ninety days in 
jail, or both, which finally put teeth into a longstanding statute on the state books. 
Although the merchants in highway shopping centers protested and sued to have 
the ordinance revoked, arguing all the way to the New Jersey Supreme Court that 
their ability to compete with stores in neighboring towns was undermined, they lost. 
Meanwhile, agitation continued for an effective  state-wide restriction of  Sunday 
shopping so as not to penalize particular locales with blue laws, and the New Jersey 
legislature finally agreed to allow counties to hold referenda on the question. In 
November  1959, voting took place  in fifteen of  the  state's twenty-one counties; 
twelve counties, including Bergen, voted a Sunday ban into law. Although highway 
discount stores appealed, the State Supreme Court eventually upheld the law, as did 
the U.S. Supreme Court indirectly when it ruled in 1961 on four companion cases 
concerning the constitutionality of Sunday closing laws in Maryland,  Massachusetts, 
and Pennsylvania. The Supreme Court held that such laws did not violate freedom 
of  religion  as  protected  under  the  First Amendment  or  the  equal  protection 
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment and thereby left it to individual states 
to Build Business, Chamber Told," January  30, 1958: 3; "Gooding Introduced to City Merchants:  First 
Paid Executive Secretary Will Plan Promotions for Stores," January 30,  1958: 31; "Bohn Rejects 
Business Role in Tax Boost," June 6, 1959: 9; and "Main Street Is After Money," The Record (March 
21, 1968): Cl. 
On other towns in northern New Jersey, see,  in Bergen Evening Record, "O'Neil Proposes Park 
Garage as Boon to Englewood Stores," October 18, 1957: 25; "Village Preparing Spaces for Parking  of 
90 Cars" [Ridgewood], November 6, 1957: 33; "Chamber to Try Charge-It Plan" [Ramsey], Novem- 
ber 8, 1957: 20; "Ridgewood Storekeepers Act to Attract Holiday Shoppers,"  November 12, 1957: sect. 
2, p. 1; "Chamber  President Finds Shopping Off" [Bergenfield], December 27, 1957: 9; "Drop of 5-10% 
Reported in Christmas Business" [Dumont], December 31, 1957: 5; "Shop at Local Stores, Kiwanis 
Members  Told"  [New  Milford],  March 2,  1960:  9.  For  an  excellent  case  study  of  Lancaster, 
Pennsylvania's  struggle with suburban retail competition and central city decline, see David Schuyler, 
"Prologue to Urban Renewal: The Problem of Downtown Lancaster, 1945-1960," Pennsylvania  History 
61 (January 1994): 75-101. 
28 "Bergen Wary of Shopping on Sundays,"  New York Times, September 7, 1993. 
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and localities to regulate Sunday selling as they wished. Due, no doubt, to strong 
advocacy by influential local  businessmen, Bergen  County was reputed to  have 
made the greatest effort at enforcing blue laws of any county in New Jersey; a local 
magistrate even  ordered that cigarette vending machines in a Howard Johnson 
restaurant be unplugged on Sunday. Nationwide during the late  1950s and early 
1960s,  retailers  skirmished over  Sunday closing  laws,  not  so  much  defending 
traditional mores  as  using  the  separation  of  church and  state  to  veil  intense 
struggles over the  extent to which discount stores, shopping centers,  and chain 
stores could capture millions of  dollars in retail business through restructuring 
consumer markets.29 
The second way that downtown business people sought to harness the power of 
the state in fighting the shopping centers involved the use of federal funds for urban 
renewal. The 1954 National Housing Act and the 1956 Federal Highway Act made 
it possible for cities to use urban renewal grants for rehabilitation of commercial 
areas; the federal government pledged from two-thirds to three-quarters of the cost 
of acquiring land and demolishing structures. Paterson proved the most aggressive 
of the cities in Bergen and Passaic counties in pursuing this strategy,  joining with at 
least sixteen other communities in the metropolitan New York area. Dissatisfied 
with the gains from the Commercial Development Fund's promotional and parking 
efforts, civic leaders founded  PLAN  (Paterson Looks Ahead  Now)  in the  early 
1960s to redevelop 121 acres at the core of downtown. PLAN implemented a design 
by Victor Gruen, who had become an early advocate of the revival of downtowns 
through careful commercial planning, much as he had pioneered the development 
of regional shopping centers, themselves the source of many cities' economic ills. 
Bringing many of the characteristics of Bergen County shopping centers to the 
Paterson city center, Gruen designed wide, landscaped pedestrian areas, accessible 
through loop roadways tied in with six parking garages accommodating 4,500 cars. 
With Uncle Sam committed to footing three-quarters of the $24 million bill, local 
civic  leaders  headed  by  PLAN  president  Raymond  J.  Behrman,  owner  of  a 
downtown luggage  and women's  accessories  store, worked to  reverse a  drastic 
decline: by 1962, the number of Paterson shoppers had fallen to half what it had 
been in 1940, despite all the population growth in the region. Soon, Hackensack was 
talking about applying for urban renewal funds as well. But this injection of federal 
dollars failed  as  a  remedy. In  1971,  shopping  centers  in  the  Paterson/Passaic 
29 Thompson, "Suburb  That Macy's Built," 200; Feinberg, What  Makes Shopping Centers  Tick, 101. 
The political and legal struggle over establishing blue laws in Paramus  and Bergen County can be traced 
in the Bergen  Evening  Record, beginning in 1957. The battle continued into recent times, with another 
Bergen County referendum in November 1993, which upheld the Sunday closing ban. Paramus and 
Bergen County are among a very few places in New Jersey that still have blue laws on the books. On 
the recent referendum, see, in the New York Times, "On Sundays, Bergen Shoppers Rest," Decem- 
ber 7,  1992; "Bergen Stores Try to  Repeal  'Blue Laws,"' August 27,  1993: Bi;  "Bergen Wary of 
Shopping on Sundays,"  September 7, 1993: B1; "Malls Wrestle with the Blues," September 26, 1993; 
and "Both Sides of Aisle  Converge over Blue Laws," The Record (October 13, 1993): C3; "Bergen 
Stores to Stay Closed on Sundays," Star-Ledger,  November 3, 1993. On the struggle over blue laws 
nationwide, including New Jersey, during the late 1950s and 1960s, see  Gerald Gunther, Cases and 
Materials on Individual Rights in Constitutional  Law, 3d edn. (Mineola, N.Y.,  1981), 1183-84; E. B. 
Weiss, "Never on Sunday? A  Study on Sunday Retailing" (New York: Doyle Dane  Bernbach, Inc., 
1962), mimeograph, esp. 11, 36-43,  59, 63, 79, 83-84. My thanks to Alexis McCrossen for bringing this 
last document to my attention. 
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metropolitan area captured 79 percent of all retail trade, well beyond the average 
of  50  percent  for  the  nation's  twenty-one largest  metropolitan  areas. In  1950, 
Paterson was a major shopping district, while  retail in Paramus hardly existed; 
twenty years later, Paterson found itself suffering from long-term economic decline, 
ignored by recently constructed parkways, turnpikes, and interstates and facing 
intense competition from shopping centers, while Paramus was well on its way to 
becoming one  of the largest retail centers in the world. As the segmentation of 
consumer markets became the guiding principle in postwar commerce, no amount 
of revitalization could make a city whose population was becoming increasingly 
minority and poor  attractive to  the white  middle-class shoppers with money to 
spend.30 
While local merchants in Bergen and Passaic counties struggled, the big New 
York  and  Newark  stores  developed  their  own  strategy for  dealing  with  the 
competition from the new suburban shopping centers: they opened branch stores. 
Rather than be eclipsed by the postwar shift in population, they followed it. By the 
late 1950s, branch stores-once  a rarity-had  become a national trend among large 
department stores. When department stores with annual net sales of $10 million or 
more were considered, the percentage of branch sales skyrocketed from 4 percent 
of  total sales in  1951 to  32 percent by 1959; specialty stores with sales over $1 
million made a comparable shift from 6 percent of sales through branches to 33 
percent over the same period. By 1959, the very success of  a regional shopping 
center like Bergen Mall or Garden State Plaza depended  on the quality of  the 
department-store branches that served as its anchors. In time, branch stores evolved 
from small outlets  of  Fifth Avenue  flagship stores into full-fledged department 
stores carrying a wide range of merchandise. In the early 1970s, in fact, Bergen 
Mall's Stern Brothers took the dramatic step of closing its New York City stores, 
investing everything in its more profitable shopping-center branches. Sterns was not 
alone; by 1976, branch sales amounted to nearly 78 percent of total department- 
store business nationwide. The huge postwar investment in suburban stores had 
significant consequences for consumers, for local retailers, and, as we shall see, for 
department store employees as well.31 
By  the  1960s,  the  mass-consumption  economy  had  brought  about  a  major 
restructuring  of consumer markets. As retail dollars moved out of major cities and 
away from established downtowns within suburban  areas, regional shopping centers 
30 "Supermarkets  Hub of Suburbs,"  New York Times (February 7, 1971): 58; "Main Street Making 
Comeback in Duel with Shopping Centers,"  New York  Times (May 31, 1962): 1; Feinberg, What  Makes 
Shopping  Centers  Tick, 100-02; Gillette, "Evolution of the Planned Shopping Center," 454-56; "A New 
Hackensack Sky Line Looms on Drawing Boards," Bergen  Evening Record (December 26, 1957): 40; 
James  B.  Kenyon, Industrial Localization and Metropolitan Growth: The Paterson-Passaic District 
(Chicago,  1960), 209-10;  Paterson Planning Board and Boorman and Dorram, Inc., Consultants, 
"Traffic  and Transportation  Survey,  Paterson Master Plan, Report 3, August 1964";  Rutgers University 
Bureau of  Economic  Research  in  contract to  New  Jersey Dept.  of  Conservation and Economic 
Development  for  the  Meadowland Regional  Development  Agency  and the  State  of  New  Jersey, 
"Technical Report No. 1H: Patterns of Urban Growth and Decline," November 1966, Box A, Folder 
7, pp. IH-38, 64, Erber, NPL. 
31  Sternlieb, Future of the Downtown Department  Store, 33-36;  Rich, Shopping Center Behavior of 
Department  Store Customers,  52-54; Editors of Fortune,  ChangingAmerican  Market,  85-86; John Wallis 
Johnston, The Department-Store  Buyer:  A  View  from Inside the Parent-Branch  Complexes, Studies in 
Marketing  No. 12 (Austin, Tex., 1969), 25; Jay Scher, Financial and Operating  Results  of Department  and 
Specialty  Stores of 1976 (New York, 1977), cited in Teaford, Rough Road to Renaissance, 208. 
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became the.distinctive public space of the postwar landscape. Suburban  populations 
increasingly looked to the mall for a new kind of community life-consumption- 
oriented, tightly controlled, and aimed at citizen-consumers who preferably were 
white and middle class. This commercialization of public space during the postwar 
era had profound effects, perhaps the most important of which was the struggle to 
define what kind of political behavior was permissible in the new,-  privately owned 
public place. 
WHEREAS, AT FIRST,  DEVELOPERS  had sought to legitimize the new shopping centers 
by arguing for their centrality to both commerce and community, over time they 
discovered that those  two commitments could be  in conflict. The rights of  free 
speech and assembly traditionally safeguarded in the public forums of democratic 
communities were not always good for business, and they could conflict with the 
rights of private property owners-the  shopping centers-to  control entry to their 
land. Beginning in the 1960s, American courts all the way up to the Supreme Court 
struggled with the political consequences of having moved public life off the street 
and into the privately owned shopping center. Shopping centers, in turn, began to 
reconsider the desirable balance between commerce and community in what had 
become the major sites where suburbanites congregated.32 
Once regional shopping centers like the Paramus malls had opened in the 1950s, 
people began to recognize them as public spaces and to use them to reach out to 
the community. When the Red Cross held blood drives, when labor unions picketed 
stores in organizing campaigns, when political candidates campaigned for office, 
when  anti-war and anti-nuclear activists gathered signatures for petitions,  they 
all viewed the shopping center as the obvious place to reach masses of people. 
Although  shopping centers varied in  their  responses-from  tolerating political 
activists to monitoring their actions to prohibiting them outright-in  general, they 
were wary of any activity that might offend customers. A long, complex series of 
court tests resulted, culminating in several key Supreme Court decisions that sought 
to sort out the conflict between two basic rights in a free society: free speech and 
private property. Not surprisingly,  the cases hinged on arguments about the extent 
to which the  shopping center had displaced the  traditional "town square" as a 
legitimate public forum.33 
The first ruling by the Supreme Court was Amalgamated Food Employees Union 
Local 590 vs. Logan Valley  Plaza, Inc. (1968), in which Justice Thurgood Marshall, 
writing for the majority, argued that refusing to let union members picket the Weis 
32 Shopping centers retreated from promoting themselves as central squares and street corners not 
only because of the free speech issue but also to limit the loitering of young people. New York  Times: 
"Supermarkets Hub  of  Suburbs," February 7,  1971: 58;  "Coping with  Shopping-Center Crises, 
Dilemma: How Tough to Get If Young Are Unruly," March 7, 1971: sect. 3, p. 1; "Shopping Centers 
Change and Grow," May 23, 1971: sect. 7, p. 1. 
33 For a useful summary of the relevant court cases and legal issues involved, see Curtis J. Berger, 
"PruneYard  Revisited: Political Activity on Private Lands,"  New York University  Law Review 66 (June 
1991): 633-94; also "Shopping Centers Change and Grow,"  New York Times (May 23, 1971): sect. 7, 
p. 1. The corporate shopping center's antagonism to free political expression and social action is dis- 
cussed in Herbert I. Schiller, Culture  Inc.: The Corporate  Takeover  of Public Expression (New York, 
1989), 98-101. 
AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW  OCTOBER 1996 From  Town  Center  to  Shonning  Center  1069 
Markets in the Logan Valley Plaza in Altoona, Pennsylvania, violated the workers' 
First  Amendment  rights,  since  shopping  centers  had  become  the  "functional 
equivalent" of a sidewalk in a public business district. Because peaceful picketing 
and leaflet distribution on "streets, sidewalks, parks, and other similar public places 
are so  historically associated with the  exercise of  First Amendment  rights," he 
wrote, it should also be protected in the public thoroughfare of a shopping center, 
even if privately owned. The Logan Valley Plaza decision likened the  shopping 
center to a company town, which had been the subject of an important Supreme 
Court decision in Marsh  vs.  Alabama (1946), upholding the First Amendment rights 
of a Jehovah's Witness to proselytize in the company town of Chickasaw,  Alabama, 
despite the fact that the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation owned all the property in 
town.  The  "Marsh Doctrine"  affirmed First  Amendment  rights  over  private 
property rights when an owner opened up his or her property for use by the public.34 
The stance taken in Logan Valley began to unravel, however, as the Supreme Court 
became more conservative under President Richard Nixon's appointees. In Lloyd 
Corp. vs. Tanner (1972), Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., wrote for the majority that 
allowing anti-war advocates to pass out leaflets at the Lloyd Center in Portland, 
Oregon,  would  be  an  unwarranted infringement  of  property  rights  "without 
significantly enhancing the  asserted right of  free  speech." Anti-war leaflets,  he 
argued,  could  be  effectively  distributed  elsewhere,  without  undermining  the 
shopping center's appeal to customers with litter and distraction.35 
The reigning Supreme Court decision  today is PruneYard  Shopping Center vs. 
Robbins (1980).  The  Supreme Court upheld  a California State  Supreme Court 
ruling that the state constitution granted a group of high school students the right 
to  gather petitions  against the  U.N.  resolution  "Zionism is Racism." The court 
decided that this action did not violate the San Jose mall owner's rights under the 
U.S. Constitution. But, at the same time, the court reaffirmed its earlier decisions 
34On  Amalgamated vs. Logan Valley  Plaza, see "Property  Rights vs. Free Speech," New York Times 
(July 9, 1972): sect. 7, p. 9; "Amalgamated  Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza," 
88 S.Ct. 1601 (1968), Supreme Court  Reporter,  1601-20; 391 US 308, U.S. Supreme Court Recording 
Briefs  1967,  No.  478,  microfiche; "Free  Speech:  Peaceful  Picketing on  Quasi-Public Property," 
Minnesota Law Review 53 (March 1969): 873-82.  On Marsh vs. State of Alabama, see  66 S.Ct. 276, 
Supreme  Court  Reporter,  276-84. Other relevant cases between Marsh  vs.  Alabama and  Amalgamated  vs. 
Logan Valley  Plaza are Nahas vs. Local 905, Retail Clerks  International  Assoc.  (1956), Amalgamated 
Clothing  Workers  of America vs. Wonderland  Shopping  Center,  Inc. (1963), Schwartz-Torrance  Investment 
Corp. vs. Bakery  and Confectionary  Workers'  Union, Local No. 31 (1964); with each case, the Warren 
court was moving closer to a recognition that the shopping center was becoming a new kind of public 
forum. 
35 "4 Nixon Appointees End Court's School Unanimity, Shopping Centers' Right to Ban Pamphle- 
teering Is Upheld, 5 to 4," New York  Times  (June 23, 1972): 1; "Shopping-Center  Industry  Hails Court," 
New York  Times (July 2, 1972): sect. 3, p. 7; "Lloyd Corporation, Ltd. v. Donald M. Tanner (1972)," 92 
S.Ct. 2219 (1972), Supreme  Court  Reporter,  2219-37. The American Civil Liberties Union brief went to 
great lengths to document the extent to which shopping centers have replaced traditional business 
districts; see  "Brief for  Respondents," U.S.  Supreme Court Record,  microfiche, 20-29.  See  also 
People's Lobby Brief, U.S. Supreme Court Record, microfiche, 5. 
The Supreme Court majority  wanted to make it clear that in finding in favor of the Lloyd Center, it 
was not reversing the Logan Valley decision, arguing for a distinction based on the fact that anti-war 
leafletting was "unrelated"  to the shopping center, while the labor union was picketing an employer. 
The four dissenting justices, however, were less sure that the distinction was valid and that the Logan 
Valley decision was not seriously weakened by Lloyd. The important court cases between Amalgamated 
vs. Logan Valley  Plaza and Lloyd vs. Tanner  included Blue Ridge  Shopping  Center  vs. Schleininger  (1968), 
Sutherland  vs. Southcenter  Shopping Center (1971), and Diamond vs. Bland (1970, 1974). 
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in Lloyd vs. Tanner and Scott Hudgens vs. National Labor Relations Board (1976) 
that the First Amendment did not guarantee access to shopping malls, and it left it 
to the states to decide for themselves whether their own constitutions protected 
such access. 
Since PruneYard,  state appellate courts have been struggling with the issue, and 
mall owners have been winning in many more states than they have lost. Only in six 
states,  California, Oregon, Massachusetts, Colorado, Washington, and most re- 
cently New Jersey, have state supreme courts protected citizens' right of free speech 
in privately owned shopping centers. In New Jersey, the courts have been involved 
for some time in adjudicating free speech in 'shopping  centers. In 1983, the Bergen 
Mall was the setting of  a suit between its owners and a political candidate who 
wanted to distribute campaign materials there. When a Paramus Municipal Court 
judge ruled in favor of the mall, the candidate's attorney successfully appealed on 
the familiar grounds that "there is no real downtown Paramus. Areas of the mall 
outside the stores are the town's public sidewalks." He further noted that the mall 
hosted community events and contained a meeting hall, post office, and Roman 
Catholic chapel. In this case, and in another one the following year over the right 
of nuclear-freeze advocates to distribute literature at the Bergen Mall, free speech 
was protected on the grounds that the mall was equivalent to a town center.36 
Such suits should be unnecessary (at least for a while) in New Jersey, because in 
a historic decision in December 1994 the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed that 
the state constitution guaranteed free speech to opponents of the Persian Gulf War 
who wanted to distribute leaflets at ten regional malls throughout the state. Writing 
for the majority, Chief Justice Robert N. Wilentz confirmed how extensively public 
space has been transformed in postwar New Jersey: 
The economic  lifeblood once found downtown  has moved to suburban  shopping  centers, 
which have substantially  displaced the downtown  business districts as the centers of 
commercial  and social activity  ...  Found  at these malls  are most of the uses and activities 
citizens  engage  in outside  their  homes  ...  This  is the new,  the improved,  the more  attractive 
downtown  business  district-the new community-and no use is more closely associated 
with the old downtown  than leafletting.  Defendants  have taken that old downtown  away 
from its former  home and moved  all of it, except  free speech,  to the suburbs. 
Despite the New Jersey Supreme Court's commitment to free speech, it nonetheless 
put limits on it, reaffirming the regional mall owners' property rights. Its ruling 
allowed only the distribution of leaflets-no  speeches, bullhorns, pickets, parades, 
demonstrations, or solicitation of funds. Moreover, the court granted owners broad 
36 Berger, "PruneYard  Revisited"; Kowinski, Malling of America, 196-202, 355-59; "Shopping Malls 
Protest Intrusion by Protesters,"  New York  Times (July 19, 1983): B1; "Opening of Malls Fought,"  New 
York  Times (May 13, 1984): sect. 11 (New Jersey), 7; "Michael Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Center 
(1979)," 592 P. 2nd 341, Pacific Reporter,  341-51; "PruneYard Shopping Center v. Michael Robins," 
100 S.Ct. 2035 (1980), Supreme Court Reporter, 2035-51;  U.S.  Supreme Court Record, PruneYard 
Shopping  Center  vs. Robins (1980), microfiche. The most important Supreme Court case between Lloyd 
vs. Tanner and PruneYard  was Scott Hudgens vs. National Labor Relations Board (1976), where the 
majority decision backed further away from Logan Valley Plaza and refused to see  the mall as the 
functional equivalent of downtown. "Scott Hudgens v. National Labor Relations Board," 96 S.Ct. 1029 
(1976), Supreme  Court  Reporter,  1029-47. 
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powers to regulate leaflet distribution by specifying days, hours, and areas in or 
outside the mall permissible for political activity. Thus, although shopping centers 
in New Jersey and five other states have been forced to accommodate some political 
activity, they have retained authority to regulate it and are even finding ways of 
preventing legal leafletters from exercising their constitutional rights, such as by 
requiring them to have million-dollar liability policies, which are often unobtainable 
or prohibitively expensive. In many other states, shopping centers have been able to 
prohibit political action outright, much as they control the  economic  and social 
behavior of shoppers and store owners.37 
An  unintended consequence  of  the American shift in orientation from public 
town center to private shopping center, then, has been the narrowing  of the ground 
where constitutionally protected free  speech  and free  assembly can legally take 
place. As Justice Marshall so prophetically warned in his Lloyd vs. Tanner dissent 
in 1972, as he watched the Berger court reverse many of the liberal decisions of the 
Warren court, 
It would  not be surprising  in the future  to see cities  rely  more  and  more  on private  businesses 
to perform  functions  once performed  by governmental  agencies  ...  As governments  rely  on 
private enterprise,  public property  decreases in favor of privately  owned property.  It 
becomes  harder  and  harder  for citizens  to communicate  with  other  citizens.  Only  the wealthy 
may find effective communication  possible unless we adhere to Marsh  v. Alabama  and 
continue  to hold that "the  more an owner,  for his advantage,  opens up his property  for use 
by the public  in general,  the more do his rights  become  circumscribed  by the statutory  and 
constitutional  rights  of those who use it."38 
And yet, as Marshall's dissent hinted, and as New Jersey Supreme Court Justice 
Marie Garibaldi further spelled out, even while advocates for freedom of speech 
rightfully insist that private property owners respect free speech because their malls 
have become the new public places, ironically they are endorsing a restructuring  of 
community that could undermine democratic freedom. In the words of Garibaldi's 
dissent, "Under the majority's  theory, private property becomes municipal land and 
private property owners become the government." The recent growth of self-taxing 
districts to clean, police, and upgrade neighborhoods, free of municipal oversight or 
public accountability, suggests some of the worrisome directions American society 
may be headed as once-public spaces and services become privatized.39 
37 "Court  Protects Speech in Malls,"  New York  Times (December 21, 1994): Al;  "Big Malls Ordered 
to Allow Leafletting," Star-Ledger  (December 21, 1994): 1; "Now, Public Rights in Private Domains," 
New York  Times (December 25, 1994): E3; "Free Speech in the Mall,"  New York  Times (December 26, 
1994): 38; Frank Askin, "Shopping for Free Speech at the Malls," 1995, unpublished ms. in possession 
of the author. 
38 Marshall dissent, Lloyd vs. Tanner, 92 S.Ct. 2219 (1972), Supreme  Court  Reporter,  2237. 
39 New York Times: "Business Districts Grow at Price of Accountability," November 20, 1994: Al; 
"Now, Public Rights in Private Domains," December  25,  1994: E3; "'Goon  Squads' Prey on  the 
Homeless,  Advocates  Say," April  14,  1995:  Bi;  "City Council  Orders  Review  of  33  Business 
Improvement Districts," April 19, 1995: Bi;  "When Neighborhoods Are Privatized," November 30, 
1995. A  1992 Supreme Court ruling, written by Justice Clarence Thomas, strengthened the hand of 
private property owners like the Lechmere store chain in keeping out union organizers. The decision 
has led malls to ban Salvation Army bell ringers at holiday time in order to protect themselves against 
union claims to equal access. "A New Grinch Turns Up at the Mall," New York Times (December 18, 
1995): A12. 
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ALONG  WITH TRENDS  TOWARD  COMMERCIALIZATION and privatization, the shift from 
downtown to shopping center entailed a feminization of public space. For at least 
the last two centuries, American women have been  the major shoppers in their 
families. That pattern continued in the postwar period, with marketers estimating 
that women not only took on anywhere from 80 to 92 percent of the shopping but 
also spent a great deal of their time at it.40  In a noteworthy departure from earlier 
times, however, the  era of  the  shopping center saw significant public space-in 
private hands-being  tailored to women's needs and desires as consumers. While 
the department store born of the nineteertth century created similarly feminized 
space, the urban commercial district of which it was a part catered as much to male 
consumption, leisure, and associational life  through bars, clubs, pool halls, and 
smoke shops, to say nothing of the male-dominated street resulting from the mix of 
commercial and corporate culture downtown. The  shopping center, in contrast, 
created  the  equivalent  of  a  downtown district dedicated  primarily to  female- 
orchestrated consumption.41 
Shopping centers were planned with the female consumer in mind. As women 
patrons  increasingly drove  their  own  cars,  they  found  parking spaces  at  the 
shopping. center designed wider than usual for the express purpose of making it 
easier for them-many  of whom were new drivers-to  park.42  Women then entered 
a well-controlled "public" space that made them feel comfortable and safe, with 
activities planned to  appeal especially to  women  and children. From the  color 
schemes,  stroller  ramps, baby-sitting services,  and  special  lockers  for  "ladies' 
wraps," to the reassuring security guards and special events such as fashion shows, 
shopping centers were created as female worlds. "I wouldn't know how to design a 
center for a man," admitted Jack Follet of John Graham, Inc., a firm responsible for 
many shopping centers. And if New Jersey resident Mrs. Bonnie Porrazzo was any 
indication, designers like Follet knew what they were doing. Four or five times a 
week, she visited a shopping center three minutes from her suburban  home because, 
"It's great for women. What else is there to do?"43 
Not only did the shopping center pitch itself to women, it sought to empower 
them as orchestrators of their families' leisure. Marketing surveys revealed that 
40 Jonassen, Downtown versus Suburban  Shopping, 15; Alan Voorhees, Shopping  Habits and Travel 
Patterns (Washington, D.C., 1955), 6; Rich, Shopping  Behavior of Department  Store Customers,  61-64; 
on  the long history of women as shoppers, see  Steven Lubar, "Men and Women, Production and 
Consumption,"  keynote address to the "His and Hers: Gender and the Consumer"  conference, Hagley 
Museum and Library,  April 1994. The increasingly sophisticated field of market research addressed 
itself to motivating the female consumer. An excellent example is Janet L. Wolff, What  Makes Women 
Buy:  A Guide to Understanding  and Influencing  the New Woman  of Today (New York, 1958). 
41  My thanks to William Becker and Richard Longstreth, both of George Washington University, for 
their suggestions on comparing the gendered character of the downtown street to the shopping center. 
Also see Gunther Barth, City People: The Rise of Modem City Culture  in Nineteenth-Century  America 
(New  York,  1980); Elaine  Abelson,  When Ladies  Go A-Thieving: Middle-Class Shoplifters in  the 
Victorian Department Store (New  York,  1989); William Leach, "Transformations in  a  Culture of 
Consumption:  Women and Department Stores, 1890-1925," Journal  of American  History  71 (September 
1984): 319-42. 
42  On women  driving, and specifically using a car for shopping, see  Rich, Shopping Behavior of 
Department  Store Customers,  84-85,  137-38; L. Pratt, "Impact  of Regional Shopping Centers in Bergen 
County";  Voorhees, Shopping  Habits and Travel  Patterns, 17. 
43 Herzog, "Shops, Culture, Centers-and  More," 35; "Busy Day in Busy Willowbrook Mall," New 
York Times (April 2, 1972): 55, 65; Harris, Cultural  Excursions, 281. 
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almost half of all women shopped for four or more people, usually members of their 
families. With the advent of the suburban malls, they were increasingly bringing 
those family members along. Female shoppers in Bergen County surveyed by the 
Pratts in the  first few years after the  centers opened  revealed that four in ten 
families  were  spending  more  time  shopping,  three  in  ten  were  making more 
shopping trips, two in ten were taking the children more often, and two in ten were 
including their husbands more frequently than before the malls were built. A study 
comparing family shopping in downtown Cincinnati with its suburban shopping 
centers concurred, finding that while  85 percent of  downtown patrons shopped 
alone, only 43 percent of shopping-center patrons were alone; most of them were 
accompanied by family members. Accordingly, evenings and weekends were by far 
the  busiest  time  in malls, creating peaks and valleys in shopping that had not 
affected downtown stores nearly as much. In many suburban  centers, more than half 
the volume of business was done at night. At the Bergen Mall, the peak traffic count 
was at 8 p.m., and shopping was very heavy on Saturdays as well. A May Company 
executive described one  of the largest problems in branch-store operation: "the 
biggest day in the suburban store will be ten times the poorest day, instead of five 
as it usually is downtown."44 
Shopping centers responded with stores and programming specifically designed 
to appeal to families, to encourage them further to spend leisure time at the mall. 
William  M.  Batten,  board  chair  of  J.  C.  Penney,  for  example,  recalled  "the 
broadening of  our lines  of  merchandise and our services to  encompass a fuller 
spectrum of  family activity" as the  company began building stores  in shopping 
centers rather than on  Main Street in the  late  1950s and 1960s; only then  did 
Penney's  start  selling  appliances,  hardware, and  sporting  goods  and  offering 
portrait studios, restaurants, auto service, and Singer sewing instruction. As families 
strolled and shopped together at the mall, they engaged in what increasingly was 
becoming a form of leisure that was female directed and hence bore witness to a 
wife's or mother's control.45 (See Figure 6.) 
Female  authority was  also  enhanced  by  shopping  centers  as  they  became 
associated with a huge expansion of consumer credit in the postwar era. In 1950, the 
ratio of credit to disposable income was 10.4 percent, with $21.5 billion worth of 
debt outstanding. By 1960, the ratio had grown to 16.1 percent, the debt to $56.1 
billion; a decade later, they had reached 18.5 percent and $127 billion, respectively. 
The trend was apparent in Bergen County. Bamberger's promoted its Garden State 
Plaza store as offering "a credit plan to suit every need," a choice between Regular 
44 Rich, Shopping  Behavior  of Department  Store Customers,  64, 71-74; L. Pratt, "Impact of Regional 
Shopping Centers in Bergen County";  Sternlieb, Future  of the Downtown  Department  Store, 27-28, 184; 
Feinberg, What  Makes Shopping Centers Tick, 97; Oaks, Managing Suburban  Branches of Department 
Stores, 72. 
45 JCPenney, "An American Legacy, A 90th Anniversary  History"  (1992), brochure, 22, 25, JCPenney 
Archives, Dallas, Texas; Mary Elizabeth Curry, Creating  an American Institution: The Merchandising 
Genius of J. C. Penney (New York, 1993), 311-13; William M. Batten, The  Penney  Idea: Foundation  for 
the Continuing  Growth  of the J. C. Penney Company (New York, 1967), 17. The opening of the J. C. 
Penney store in Garden State Plaza in 1958 is featured in a film, The Past Is a Prologue (1961), which 
is one of several fascinating movies made by the company that have been collected on a video, Penney 
Premieres,  available through the JCPenney Archives. Also see Penney News 24 (November-December 
1958): 1, 7, on the new Paramus store, JCPenney Archives; R. H. Macy & Company,  Annual Report  for 
1957 (New York, 1957), 26. 
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FIGURE  6: This  page  from  Macy's annual  report  to  shareholders  the  year  its Garden  State  Plaza opened 
conveys  the  importance  of  the  female-dominated  family  market  to  shopping-center  merchandising.  Note 
particularly the invocation of "the 'togetherness'  of family shopping" in the bottom caption. Reproduced  from 
R.  H.  Macy &  Co.,  Inc.,  1957 Annual  Report, courtesy  of  Robert  F.  Wagner  Labor Archives,  New  York 
University,  from its Department  Store Workers-Local  1-S Collection,  Box 2, Folder  61. 
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Charge Accounts,  Budget  Charge Accounts,  and Deferred  Payment Accounts. 
Once  customers came  into  the  store,  an innovative teletype  hook-up with  the 
Bergen County Credit Bureau enabled charge accounts to be established quickly. 
Another Garden State Plaza anchor store, J. C. Penney, which had long built its 
identity around low price, cash-and-carry  purchasing, finally recognized in 1957 that 
credit was expected, even demanded, by consumers, and became the last of the 
large nationwide retailers to introduce a company credit card. By 1962, national 
credit  facilities  and  systems  were. operating  with  the  latest  electronic  data- 
processing technology, and charging had become the standard  way to buy. As credit 
cards increasingly became  the  legal  tender of  shopping-center purchasing, they 
expanded  women's  control  over  family -finances from  spending  the  domestic 
allowance assigned from the weekly or monthly paycheck to committing the family's 
present and future savings. It should also be noted, however, that credit cards at the 
same  time  reinforced women's  economic  dependence  on  men,  since  qualifying 
generally depended  on husbands' or fathers' income, even when women earned 
money of their own.46 
As the example of credit cards illustrates, even as women gained power in the 
family and in the public realm with the emergence of shopping centers, so, too, were 
their horizons limited by them. Women's public roles were  expected to  remain 
defined as consumers, and transcending that role was difficult. The most telling case 
involved the fate of women as workers in shopping centers like Bergen Mall and 
Garden State Plaza. As the department stores established branches, they increas- 
ingly turned to suburban housewives as retail clerks. The fit seemed perfect. Many 
women were interested in part-time work, and the stores were looking for part-time 
labor  to  service  the  notorious  peaks  and valleys  in  suburban shopping. As  a 
Stanford Business School professor advised branch managers in the year the Bergen 
County shopping centers opened, "Fortunately, most of these suburban  stores have 
in  their  immediate  neighborhood  a  large  number  of  housewives  and  other 
nonemployed women who have been  willing to work during these  evening and 
Saturday  peak periods ...  Many of these women apparently  work as much because 
of interest as because of economic necessity, and, as a rule, they have proved to be 
excellent  salespeople."  The  Paramus malls  took  heed:  by  the  mid-1960s,  the 
46 Barry Bluestone, Patricia Hanna, Sarah Kuhn, and Laura Moore, The Retail Revolution:  Market 
Transformation,  Investment,  and Labor in the Modern Department  Store (Boston, 1981), 46-47;  Rich, 
Shopping  Behavior  of Department  Store Customers,  100-01; "'It Won't Be Long Now . . . ': Bamberger's 
New Jersey's Greatest Store, Comes to Paramus Soon," stamped August 22, 1956, file "Bergen County 
Shopping Centers," Johnson Free Public Library,  Hackensack; press release, "The Garden State Plaza 
Opens  Wednesday, May 1st at the  Junction of  Routes  4  and  17, Paramus," Garden State Plaza 
Historical Collection; JCPenney, "An American Legacy," 21-22; Curry, Creating  an American Insti- 
tution, 305-07. 
On  the  expansion  of  credit  in  the  postwar period,  see  Marie  de  Vroet  Kobrak, "Consumer 
Installment Credit and Factors Associated with It" (M.A. thesis, University of Chicago, 1958); Lewis 
Mandell, The Credit Card Industry:  A History (Boston, 1990); Hillel Black, Buy Now Pay Later (New 
York, 1961). For a 1971 study documenting the possession of bank cards and store charge cards in the 
counties of Bergen, Passaic (New Jersey), and Rockland (New York) and when they were last used, see 
Plan One Research Corporation, Mighty  Market, 382-85.  In 1958, the Paterson Evening News cited a 
recent newspaper poll on family finances showing that the wife has full control of the family purse in 
90 percent of all families; "Even as You and I," Bergen Evening Record (January 10, 1958): 58; also 
"Handling Your Money," January 25, 1958, Bergen  Evening Record, Weekend Magazine, 4. 
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part-time employment of women had swelled the malls' combined employee ranks 
to  almost 6,000 people,  two-thirds of  them part-time and many of  them  local 
residents.47 
But  according to  New  York-area  labor unions  such as  Local  1-S, RWDSU 
(Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union),  which represented employees 
at Macy's and Bamberger's, and District 65, RWDSU,  which represented them 
at Gimbels, Sterns, and Bloomingdale's, the department stores had another motive 
for hiring so many part-timers in their new suburban branches: they were trying 
to cut labor costs and break the hold of the unions, which had organized their New 
York stores successfully enough to make.retail  clerking a decent job. Certainly, 
retailers gave a lot of attention to keeping labor costs down, judging them to be the 
greatest obstacle to higher profits. Suburban branch managers sought to limit the 
number of salespeople  needed  by depending more on customer self-service and 
"pipe-racking,"  putting goods  on floor racks rather than behind counters. Some 
stores, such as Sears Roebuck, Montgomery Ward, and J. C. Penney, expanded 
their catalog operations.48  But the basic strategy of the suburban department store 
was  to  control wages  through hiring more  part-timers at  minimum wages  and 
benefits. 
Organizing the new suburban branches became a life-and-death struggle for the 
unions beginning in the 1950s. They recognized that not only was the fate of new 
branch jobs at stake but, as retail dollars left the city for the suburbs, jobs in the 
downtown stores were threatened as well. The branch store was becoming, in effect, 
a kind of  runaway shop that undermined the job  security, wages, benefits,  and 
working conditions of unionized downtown workers. Local 1-S and District 65 tried 
all kinds of strategies, such as demanding contract coverage of the new branches 
when renegotiating their existing contracts with downtown stores; getting permis- 
sion from the National Labor Relations Board to split the bargaining units within 
particular branch stores  (such  as  into  selling,  non-selling,  and  restaurant) to 
facilitate  organization;  assigning  downtown  store  workers  to  picket  suburban 
branches  during strikes  and  organizing  campaigns; and  gaining  the  right  for 
city-store employees to transfer to branches without losing accumulated seniority 
and benefits. 
But  still,  successful labor organization of  the  suburban branches proved ex- 
tremely difficult. Branch-store management at Sterns, Bamberger's, and a Bloom- 
ingdale's that opened nearby took an aggressive stand against unionism, harassing 
and firing employees who  showed the  least  inclination to  organize, particularly 
women.  Bill  Michelson,  executive vice-president  of  District  65,  pointed  to  the 
mentality of part-time employees as another obstacle to successful organizing:  "The 
part-timer, usually a housewife in a suburban  town, is interested in picking up extra 
money  and does  not  have  deep  roots  in  her job." The  large  turnover among 
47Oaks,  Managing  Suburban  Branches  of Department  Stores,  73; "Paramus  Booms as a Store Center," 
New York Times (February 5, 1962): 34; "Sales Personnel Ready to Work," Bergen Evening Record, 
November 13, 1957. 
48 Rich, Shopping  Behavior of Department  Store Customers,  20; Sternlieb, Future of the Downtown 
Department  Store, 27; R. H. Macy & Company,  Annual Report  for 1955, 29; JCPenney, "An American 
Legacy," 25; Stuart, Our Era, 20. 
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part-time workers-through  lay-offs as well as voluntary resignation-made  orga- 
nizing them all the harder.49 
Despite  the  determined  efforts  of  Local  1-S and District  65  to  organize  all 
department store workers in the Paramus shopping centers, Gimbels was the only 
store to sign a union contract that covered its Paramus store, and this in exchange 
for a lesser wage increase and the cancellation of a threatened strike. At all the rest, 
an overwhelmingly  female work force worked part-time at minimum wage, with few 
benefits, no union representation, and limited opportunities for career advance- 
ment. (See Figure 7.) Work became a way for women to maintain their status as 
consumers, but  it  did not  significantly empower them  as producers who  could 
contribute substantially to-or  be independent of-male  earnings. At Bamberger's, 
in fact, the handbook for new employees urged them to use their staff discount to 
purchase store merchandise (20 percent off for apparel worn on the job, 10 percent 
on  other  items)  so  they  could  serve  as  model  consumers for  customers. The 
shopping center, then, contributed to a segmentation not only of consumers but of 
workers as well in a postwar labor market that offered new jobs to women but 
marked these jobs as less remunerative and more dead-end.50 Furthermore, as a 
workplace, much like as a public space, the shopping center constricted the rights 
available to the people who frequented it. That women came to dominate the ranks 
of workers and consumers there meant that their political freedom was particularly 
circumscribed. The shopping center thus posed a contradiction for women in the 
1950s and  1960s: it  empowered them  in  their families  through creating a new 
community setting catering to female needs and desires, yet it contained them in the 
larger society as consumers and part-time workers. In this era before feminist revolt 
and affirmative action opened other opportunities, women's choices were limited 
not simply through peer pressure and personal priorities, as is often claimed, but 
also through the larger economic  restructuring taking place in the metropolitan 
marketplace. 
MASS  CONSUMPTION  IN  POSTWAR  AMERICA  created a new landscape, where public 
space was more commercialized, more privatized, and more feminized within the 
49My  understanding of labor conditions and organizing in the New York area, and in the Paramus 
malls specifically, comes from two manuscript collections at the Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives, 
New York University: the papers of Local 1-S, Department Store Workers' Union  (RWDSU),  and 
District 65, now of the UAW, then of the RWDSU. I have based my analysis on the clippings, meeting 
minutes, and legal files in those collections, which I have not cited individually unless I quoted from 
them. Michelson quote from "NLRB Ruling Spurs New York Area Union: Target-50  Stores," Box 4, 
Folder 36, District 65; similar statement with two-thirds figure from "Report to  General Council 
Meeting, Department Store Section, by William Michelson," January  12, 1965, Box 5, Folder 4, District 
65. On department store efforts with part-timers, see "Part-Timer:  New Big Timer," Women's Wear 
Daily, January  8, 1964, Box 4, Folder 35, Local 1-S; also see the records of a fascinating case that Local 
1-S brought before the NLRB concerning the firing of  a young woman employee who had shown 
interest in the union: Box 9, Folder 21, Local 1-S. 
On industrial relations in department stores nationally, with a case study of the Boston metropolitan 
area, see Bluestone, et al., Retail Revolution, 70, 80-119,  148-49, which provides an excellent analysis 
of the restructuring  of the labor market in the retail trade. Also see Jacobs, The Mall, 49. 
50 Bamberger's  Paramus, "Welcome to New Friends and a New Career,"  Employee Handbook, 1957, 
Box 7, Folder 16, pp. 4, 9-12,  Local 1-S. 
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FIGURE 7: Bamberger's  Department  Store  prepared  an employee  handbook,  of which  this is the cover,  for the 
opening of its Garden State Plaza store in 1957. Hoping to recruit part-time  female employees among 
housewives  in neighboring  suburban  towns,  the store offered them "new  friends,"  while male applicants  were 
promised  "a new career."  Courtesy  of Robert F. Wagner  Labor Archives,  New York University,  from its 
Department  Store Workers,  Local 1-S Collection,  Box 7, Folder 16. 
regional shopping center than it had been in the traditional downtown center. This 
is  not  to  romanticize the  city and its central business district. Certainly, urban 
commercial property owners pursued their own economic interests, political activity 
in public spaces was sometimes limited, and the priorities of women and men did 
not always peacefully coexist. Nonetheless, the legal distinction between public and 
private space  remained  significant; urban loitering  and vagrancy laws  directed 
against undesirables in public places  have repeatedly been  struck down by the 
courts, while privately owned shopping centers have been able to enforce trespass- 
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ing laws.51  Overall, an important shift from one kind of social order to another took 
place  between  1950 and 1980, with major consequences  for Americans. A  free 
commercial  market  attached  to  a  relatively  free  public  sphere  (for  whites) 
underwent a transformation to a more regulated commercial marketplace (where 
mall management controlled access, favoring chains over local independents, for 
example) and a more circumscribed public sphere of limited rights. Economic and 
social liberalism went hand in hand and declined together. 
Not by accident, public space was restructured and segmented by class and race in 
New Jersey, as in the nation, just as African Americans gained new protections 
for their right of  equal  access to  public accommodations. Although  civil rights 
laws had been  on  the  books  in  New  Jersey since  the  late  nineteenth  century, 
comprehensive legislation with mechanisms for enforcement did not pass until the 
1940s. With the "Freeman Bill" of  1949, African Americans were finally guaran- 
teed  equal  access  to  schools,  restaurants, taverns, retail  stores,  hotels,  public 
transportation, and facilities of commercial leisure such as movie theaters, skating 
rinks, amusement  parks,  swimming pools,  and  beaches,  with  violators  subject 
to fines and jail terms. Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, African-American citizens 
of  New  Jersey-and  other  northern states-vigilantly  challenged  discrimination 
by private property owners. Yet  larger structural changes in community market- 
places were  under way, financed by private commercial interests committed to 
socioeconomic  and  racial  segmentation.  While  African  Americans  and  their 
supporters were prodding courts and legislatures to eliminate legal segregation in 
public places, real-estate developers, retailers, and consumers were collaborating to 
shift economic resources to new kinds of segregated spaces.52 
The  landscape of  mass consumption created  a metropolitan society in which 
people  were no longer brought together in central marketplaces and the parks, 
streets, and public buildings that surrounded them but, rather, were separated by 
class, gender,  and race in  differentiated commercial sub-centers. Moreover, all 
commercial  sub-centers were  not  created  equal.  Over  time,  shopping  centers 
became  increasingly class stratified, with some  like  the  Bergen  Mall marketing 
themselves to the lower middle class, while others like the Garden State Plaza went 
upscale to  attract upper middle-class consumers. If tied to international capital, 
some  central  business  districts-such  as  New  York  and  San  Francisco-have 
prospered, although they have not been left unscarred from recent retail mergers 
and leveraged buy-outs. Other downtowns, such as liackensack and Elizabeth, New 
Jersey, have become  "Cheap John Bargain Centers" serving customers too poor 
51  "Amtrak Is Ordered Not to Eject the Homeless from Penn Station," New York Times (February 
22, 1995): Al. 
52 Article on passage of New Jersey Civil Rights Bill, New York Times, March 24, 1949; Marion 
Thompson Wright, "Extending Civil Rights in New Jersey through the Division Against Discrimina- 
tion," Journal  of Negro History  38 (1953): 96-107; State of New Jersey, Governor's Committee on Civil 
Liberties, "Memorandum on  Behalf  of  Joint Council for  Civil Rights in  Support of  a Proposed 
Comprehensive Civil Rights Act for New Jersey," 1948, II, B 8, Folder "Civil Rights, New Jersey, 
1941-48," NAACP Papers, Library  of Congress, Washington, D.C.; "Report of Legislative Committee, 
NJ State Conference of NAACP Branches,"  March 26, 1949, II, B 8, Folder "Civil  Rights, New Jersey, 
1941-48," NAACP Papers. Other NAACP files on discrimination document the actual experiences of 
African Americans in New Jersey during the 1940s and 1950s. 
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and deprived of transportation to shop at malls. Even in larger American cities, 
poor  urban  populations  shop  downtown  on  weekends  while  the  white-collar 
workers who commute in to offices during the week patronize the suburban malls 
closer  to  where  they live.  Some  commercial districts have been  taken over by 
enterprising, often newly arrived, ethnic groups, who have breathed new life into 
what would otherwise have been in decay, but they nonetheless serve a segmented 
market. Worst off are cities like Newark, once the largest shopping district in the 
state, which saw every one of its major department stores close between 1964 and 
1992 and much of  its retail space remain abandoned, leaving residents such as 
Raymond Mungin to wonder, "I don't have a car to drive out to the malls. What can 
I do?" Mass consumption was supposed to bring standardization in merchandise 
and consumption patterns. Instead, diverse social groups are no longer integrated 
into central consumer marketplaces but rather are consigned to differentiated retail 
institutions, segmented markets, and new hierarchies.53 
Finally, the dependence on private spaces for public activity and the more recent 
privatization of  public  space  gravely threaten  the  government's constitutional 
obligations to  its  citizens.  Not  only freedom  of  speech  and public assembly in 
shopping centers are at issue. Just recently, Amtrack's Pennsylvania Station in New 
York City tried to stave off two suits requiring it to respect constitutional rights 
guaranteed in public places: an effort by artist Michael Lebron to display a political 
message on the gigantic curved and lighted billboard that he had rented for two 
months, and a case brought by the Center for Constitutional Rights to force Amtrak 
to stop ejecting people from the station because they are homeless.54  When Juirgen 
Habermas  theorized  about  the  rise  and  fall  of  a  rational  public  sphere,  he 
recognized the centrality in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries of accessible 
urban places-cafes,  taverns, coffeehouses,  clubs, meeting  houses,  concert  and 
lecture halls, theaters, and museums-to  the  emergence  and maintenance of  a 
democratic political culture. Over the last half-century, transformations in Amer- 
ica's  economy  and metropolitan  landscape have  expanded the  ability of  many 
people to participate in the mass market. But the commercializing, privatizing, and 
segmenting of physical gathering places that has accompanied mass consumption 
53"Closing  of 'Last' Department Store Stirs Debate on Downtown Trenton," Star-Ledger,  June 5, 
1983; "Urban Areas Crave Return of Big Markets," Star-Ledger,  July 17, 1984; "Elizabeth Clothier 
Mourns Demise of Century-Old Customized Service," Sunday Star-Ledger,  January 10, 1988; "Presi- 
dent's Report to the Annual Meeting, Passaic Valley Citizens Planning Association," Box A, Folder 3, 
Erber,  NPL.  On  Newark,  see  for  Raymond  Mungin  quotation,  "Two  Guys  Will  Be  Missed," 
Star-Ledger,  November 23, 1981. Also see "Last-Minute  Bargain Hunters Abound as Chase Closes Up," 
Newark  News, February  12, 1967; "Ohrbach's  Will Close Store in Newark, Cites Drop in Sales and Lack 
of Lease," New York Times, December 7, 1973; and, in the Star-Ledger,  "S. Klein to Shut Last State 
Stores Sometime in June," May 9, 1975; "Sears to Shut Newark Store," June 13, 1978; "Hahne's Bids 
a Farewell to Newark," June 18, 1986; "Macy's  to Shut Stores in Newark, Plainfield," May 21, 1992; 
"Newmark  & Lewis Is Closing 11 Stores," October 15, 1993; Greater Newark Chamber of Commerce, 
"Survey of  Jobs  and  Unemployment," May  1973, NPL  "Q" File;  Greater Newark Chamber of 
Commerce, "Metro New Jersey Market Report" [1991], NPL "Q" File. 
54 "Amtrak  Can Be Sued on Poster, Court Rules," New York  Times (February  22, 1995): B4; "Amtrak 
Is Ordered Not to Eject the Homeless from Penn Station," New York  Times (February 22, 1995): Al; 
"Can Amtrak Be a Censor?" Washington  Post (February 23, 1995). The Amtrak case was complicated 
by the ambiguity of Amtrak's status as a government entity or private corporation. 
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has made more precarious the shared public sphere upon which our democracy 
depends.55 
55 Jiirgen Habermas, The Structural  Transformation  of the Public Sphere:  An Inquiry  into a Category  of 
Bourgeois Society, Thomas Burger trans., with Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, Mass., 1989); Geoff 
Eley, "Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures: Placing Habermas in the  Nineteenth  Century," in 
Nicholas  B.  Dirks,  Geoff  Eley,  and  Sherry B.  Ortner, eds.,  Culture/Power/History:  A  Reader in 
Contemporary  Social Theory  (Princeton, N.J., 1994), 297-335. 
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